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Abstract
G.A. Cohen’s critique of the Rawlsian difference principle points out an inconsistency in its 
presentation. The initial equality decided by the participants in the original position under the 
veil of ignorance is not preserved by the inequality sanctioned by the difference principle. 
Cohen shows how the breakdown of the initial equality of the original position prevents the 
desired results of the Rawlsian system from being realized. Cohen argues that an egalitarian 
ethos is required within a society for equality preserving economic distributions and Pareto-
superior outcomes to occur. Nonetheless, Cohen’s analysis of Rawls misses the ultimate cause
of inequality, which is the dynamics of capital accumulation. An egalitarian ethos is only 
possible if there is a socialist mode of production to facilitate its development. Additionally, 
Cohen’s critique of Rawlsian constructivism through an argument for intuitionism does not 
address the natural-material existence of human beings. This existence must be considered for
any advantageous social formation. 
Introduction
Over G.A. Cohen’s career he was a major figure in the Analytical Marxism movement; his work 
Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defense was his seminal contribution. In Defense Cohen 
argued in favor of many Marxian categories such a historical materialism, class struggle, and 
base and superstructure distinctions. The work was powerfully argued and, I found, a delight to 
read and indispensable in the explanation of many Marxian ideas. Since its publication, Cohen 
questioned, in particular, the cogency the Marxian analytical category of exploitation and 
thought that Marxism should have more to say about normative matters. But, even though Cohen
had a critical stance towards Marxist’s methods he argued from a socialist standpoint throughout 
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all of his works. His Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality is such a work where he critiqued 
Robert Nozick’s libertarian political philosophy and argued for socialist societal arrangements. 
One of his last works, Rescuing Justice and Equality, is a book in this tradition where he 
provides a systematic critique of Rawls’s theory of just distribution and of his constructivist 
method from a socialist, but not explicitly Marxist, standpoint.1 
Rescuing is an intricate and pathbreaking philosophic work that will be of immense benefit to 
scholars who are interested in egalitarianism and socialism. This work is divided into two 
sections. The first section is an egalitarian critique of Rawlsian arguments for distribution and 
incentives. The second section is a critique of Rawls’ constructivist method and an exposition of 
Cohen’s own philosophic method for the determination of norms, which generally can be called 
intuitionist. The two sections are presented separately, but Cohen’s main intention of this work, 
that public policy and private intentions have to be in correspondence for just outcomes to 
obtain, bridges both sections. 
Cohen’s critique of Rawlsian liberalism finds its origins in Marx’s own critique of liberal 
rights theory developed in On the Jewish Question (Cohen, 2008, 1). Cohen agrees with Marx 
that a society can never achieve the full development of human abilities when people are treated 
as equal citizens and unequal private persons. Simply, Cohen thinks that the great weakness of 
liberalism, with Rawlsian liberalism as it representative type, is that rapacious self-interest 
maximization can occur along with, and contrary to, the egalitarian intentions of state 
redistributive policy. 
 Cohen’s critique is centered on Rawls’ mechanism for just distribution, which is called the 
difference principle. This principle allows for inequalities if they are to the benefit of the worst 
off. The intention of the difference principal will probably appeal to many socialists and social 
1 I will call this work Rescuing for the remainder of the article
2
democrats, as Cohen thinks it does, since gains for the best off are only permitted when the worst
off benefit. But, Cohen finds the difference principle to be contrary to the egalitarian impulse of 
Rawlsian liberalism. Inequalities in compensation are allowed by the difference principle not 
strictly to render compensation equal when indexed to arduous labor or unpleasant work, but to 
meet the demands of certain groups, usually in privileged social positions, who desire high pay 
for their preferred labor tasks or low taxes on their capital and profits. The demands of these 
privileged groups are contrary to the egalitarian spirit of the difference principle. Cohen’s 
argument against this kind of compensation is that these individuals demand higher pay for an 
amount of work that could be provided at lower pay with little detriment to themselves. High 
compensation for those who can demand it from society is not an egalitarian pay differential but 
self-interest maximizing. 
Cohen’s critique of constructivism demonstrates his philosophic acumen, and the intuitionist2 
theory he favors is persuasive, but as I argue below, not ultimately convincing. Cohen shows that
norms are not generated by constructivism; rather, he argues that norms are derived from our 
intuitions. Constructivism can generate rules for social organization but these rules are based on 
our intuitive principles. This critique has important implications for Rawls method which 
attempts to ground normative principles, at least for politics, on rationally agreed outcomes. 
Cohen’s Rescuing is a precise critique of Rawls’ difference principle but in the end misses the
reason why Rawls makes the mistake of inconsistency when allowing unjust inequality to follow 
from a commitment of equality. This oversight by Cohen is to leave out the effects capitalist 
accumulation has upon the promotion of certain activities. The capitalist mode of production will
favor and reward activities that extract surplus value. Accordingly, the social climate of 
2 The philosophic terminology will be defined when the notions are discussed. Also, I have tried to keep it to a 
minimum. Intuitionism and constructivism are defined in part III. 
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capitalism allows and condones the inegalitarian incentives that Cohen brings Rawls to task for. 
Furthermore, Rawls misidentifies the nature of capitalist accumulation and thinks that a just 
basic structure will be able to limit and control the dynamics of competition and exploitation. 
Cohen follows Rawls lead by not considering the incompatibility of egalitarianism and 
capitalism, at least not in Rescuing. Also, Cohen’s argument for intuitionism lacks a proper 
natural-materialist basis for normative claims. Cohen’s attempts to structure egalitarianism under
intuitionist principles does not attend to the needs and requirements of humans as physical and 
historical beings. Thus, Cohen’s argument for an intuitionist basis is abstract and unnecessary. 
This article will be structured in four parts. The first part will be an overview of Rawls’ theory
of justice with a focus on the difference principle. The second part will be a consideration of 
Cohen’s various critiques of the Rawlsian difference principle. The third part will be an 
overview of Cohen’s critique of constructivism and a presentation of his intuitionist theory. The 
fourth part will be my own critique of Cohen’s analysis of Rawlsian distributive theory and his 
theory of intuitionism. 
I. An Overview of Rawls
Rawls’ contribution to political philosophy is monumental and most political philosophy, at least
in the English-speaking world, since the publication of A Theory of Justice (which I will call 
Theory for the rest of the article) has been constructed in light of his accomplishments. There is 
much to learn from Rawls and if anyone wants to seriously critique liberalism on a philosophic 
level, Rawls’ Theory must be addressed. His work has been widely praised for its philosophic 
originality and penetrating critique and endorsement of certain economic inequalities. Cohen 
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finds that Rawls’ critique of inequality is inconsistent as will be shown in the second section. But
first we need to understand why Rawls said that certain inequalities should be tolerated. 
All roads in Theory lead to Rawls’ philosophic social contract method, also called 
constructivism.3 Rawls uses a philosophic device called the original position, which is a 
hypothetical situation common in the social contract theories of Hobbes and Locke. It is used to 
derive the rules of social regulation that people would choose under specific conditions. Simply, 
the conditions that Rawls assumes are: that people are rational (they know what they want and 
the order they want it), they have no knowledge of their own social position or their preferences 
and people have no information about the developmental level of the society for which they are 
choosing. This condition Rawls calls the veil of ignorance (Rawls, 1999, 11-12).4 What these 
conditions are intended to foster are the approximation of being in the position of an unbiased 
chooser. Being unbiased means that one will not pursue one’s own advantage to the unjust 
detriment of others. This is why Rawls uses the veil of ignorance and the ability to choose 
rationally as the conditions of the original position. If one can order preferences rationally, but 
doesn’t know what one’s own preferences are, then one is in the position of choosing for 
everyone. As we can see, this hypothetical situation can only generate a preference ordering for a
proxy person, which is a stand-in for all people and not the preference for an individual person 
with their personality intact. If one has to choose from the perspective of the veil of ignorance, 
how does one choose when one doesn’t know one’s social position or what one’s abilities are? 
3 Cohen finds that Rawls’ constructivism is not a social contract method (see page 337 of Rescuing Justice and 
Equality). This is why I will call Rawls’ method constructivism and not social contract nor contractarian. I will not 
consider why Cohen thinks Rawls’ method is not contractarian in this article. 
4 Many authors have criticized Rawls’ use of the original position and the veil of ignorance as devices. Thomas 
Nagel (1973), Michael Sandel (1982), and Michael Walzer (1983) all question whether it is possible to make any 
meaningful decisions of society without a prior conception of the good. In short, can we know what society we want
when we have no desire for any such society? In his later work Rawls (1993, Lecture V) does explicit state that 
people do have some notions of the good within the original position, which appears to be a revision of his position 
in Theory. Jürgen Habermas (1995) remained unconvinced by Rawls’ revisions; he still found a sufficient 
conception of the good to be excluded by the veil of ignorance.
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Simply put, you are choosing as if you are either an affluent person with rare and desirable skills 
or a poor person who has no skills. Or you are choosing as if you are young and healthy or old 
and infirm, or a man or a woman, or black or white, or a member of a majority religion or a 
despised minority sect, and so on. 
With such a lack of information, but with the knowledge that inequalities can and do occur 
without state rectification and prevention, how does one choose? Rawls thinks that without 
information of who one is and what kind of society one will enter into one cannot generate any 
probabilities for one’s prospects. One thus chooses under the conditions of uncertainty. If this is 
the case, then the only strategy one can use to generate social rules of regulation is called 
maximin, which is the maximization of the least advantaged (minimal) social position (Rawls, 
1999, 132). 
So, if one is under the veil of ignorance and one uses the maximin strategy, what rules (what 
Rawls calls principles of justice) will one choose? Rawls finds that people would choose to adopt
two principles of justice: (1) equal basic liberties for all people; and (2) “social and economic 
inequalities are to be arranged so they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s 
advantage, and (b) attached to position and offices open to all” (Rawls, 1999, 53). As we can see,
inequalities are tolerated in resource distribution, but not tolerated for political liberties.5 Rawls 
thinks that people would choose equality in political liberties and inequality in resources because
both are to people’s advantage. Also, political liberties cannot be unequal since matters of 
conscience are the most important to people (Rawls, 1999, 131).6 When it comes to the second 
5 Norman Daniels finds this discrepancy cannot be maintained since liberty is not as valuable if one has insufficient 
resources. See Daniels’ “Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth of Liberty.” Rawls (1993, 324-331) attempts to counter 
Daniels critique by maintaining what he calls the fair value of liberties. Rawls only brings up the separation of 
political power from social and economic power as the solution. But, Daniels whole critique is that these guarantees 
are insufficient within a society that allows widespread private property ownership. 
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 One of the most penetrating critiques of the two principles has been offered by H.L.A. Hart (1973). He argues that 
the selection of the two principles is not ordered in the way that Rawls thinks they are. He finds that people may 
rationally select economic gains over personal liberties. Rawls, in his later work, develops a refutation of Hart’s 
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principle, Rawls finds that equality would be the starting point when it comes to the distribution 
of resources and positions in society (Rawls, 1999, 55). Inequality will only occur if it is to the 
benefit of the worst off: “The intuitive idea is that the social order is not to establish and secure 
the more attractive prospects of those better off unless doing so is to the advantage of those less 
fortunate” (Rawls, 1999, 65). Rawls embraces equality in the control over economic resources 
and will only agree to inequalities if they are to the benefit of the worst off. This distributive rule 
is the difference principle.7 
In Table 1 we have three distributive situations demonstrating equal distribution (A) and two 
situations of economic inequality (B and C). Situation A is of initial equality where our two 
classes have equal shares of economic resources. The difference principle would permit 
movement only from situation A to situation B since situation C does not improve the resource 
shares of the worst off.
Table 1
Situation Resource shares for
the worst off
Resource shares for
the best off
Total societal wide
resource shares 
Societal wide
resource averages
A: Equality 5 5 10 5
B: Inequality permitted 
by the difference 
principle
6 7 13 6.5
C: Inequality not 
permitted by the 
difference principle
4 10 14 7.5
Table 1 has been developed by the author.
critique based on a conception of the person that prizes the priority of their conscience; Rawls argues that this is a 
more realistic understanding of an agent within the original position (1993, Lecture VIII). This clarification allows 
Rawls, he thinks, to avoid the possibility of a rational person with a preference set that orders economic gains before
personal liberties as a sufficient benchmark for all persons within the original position.
7
 Cohen major point of critique is the reasoning of the difference principle, which will be discussed in the next 
section. Also of note are the critiques by Robert Nozick (1974, chapter 7), Ronald Dworkin (1981), and Paul 
Gomberg (2007).  
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Movement away from inequality is only permitted if the resources enjoyed by the worst off 
improve (or stay the same according to some versions of the difference principle, see Cohen, 
2008, 157). 
Rawls’ main opponent in Theory is utilitarianism. Rawls’ criticism of utilitarianism is that 
beneficial determinations according to various utilitarianisms will permit outcomes that provide 
the greatest gains for the entirety of society, whether considered as total or average gains for 
society, even if certain peoples’ resource allotments decrease (Rawls, 19 and 160). Utilitarian 
reasoning, of both total sum and average varieties, will prefer situation C over B since the total 
gain for society or the average gain for all are the greatest. But, situation C entails losses for the 
worst off even though the total and average gains for the entire society are the greatest of all 
three situations. The Rawlsian difference principle thus tries to protect the prospects of the most 
vulnerable by attending to their individual positions in society.8 
If we return to the perspective of the original position, under the veil of ignorance, why would
one choose situation B over A or C? If one is using the maximin strategy when selecting 
principles of justice, and the three distributive situations help to analyze what their choice should
be, only choice B maximizes the worst off position. Since one does not know what one’s position
in society will be, B is a safer choice than C. Rawls considers people to be risk averse where 
there is uncertainty (Rawls, 1999, 133). 
Rawls’ commitment to minimizing economic inequality goes beyond the difference principle. 
He also thinks that large wealth holdings should not be inherited (Rawls, 1999, xv and 245), 
8
 Amaryta Sen’s (1980, 1992, 1999) critique of the difference principle is not with the distributive rule, as much as 
with what is being redistributed and who is identified as the worst off. Rawls thinks that basic primary goods (such 
as income, health care, and self-respect) are what should be redistributed (Rawls, 1999, 79). He thinks the least 
advantaged social class (such as unskilled workers) is who should be identified as worst off (Rawls, 1999, 84). 
Rather, Sen argues for capabilities (such as being capable to learn, work, be free to voice one opinion, etc.) as what 
should be redistributed and a more nuanced and culturally specific consideration of who are the worst off (such as 
women in India or Blacks in the United States). 
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income transfers should be used to maintain basic living standards and full employment is a 
responsibility of the state (Rawls, 1999, 244). Rawls’ overall consideration of what people would
choose in an unbiased situation is strong protections against the accumulation of wealth and 
multiple resources for the maintenance of living standards. Rawls also finds that the principle of 
justice chosen in the original position can apply to either property-owning democracy (his term 
for regulated capitalism) or socialism (Rawls, 1999, 242). Rawls’ intentions are to protect the 
economically vulnerable and permit gains for the well off and privileged only when they benefit 
the worst off. 
II: G.A. Cohen’s Critique of the Rawlsian Difference Principle
As we have seen the difference principle will only deviate from an equal distribution of 
resources when the worst off in society will gain (or at least not lose). Cohen does not disagree 
with the difference principle in general; he thinks that it retains an egalitarian impulse in its 
abstract formulation. But, Cohen finds that there is a flaw in the logic of the difference principle 
when it is applied to particular kinds of incentives. Specifically, he thinks that the difference 
principle is not a justification for a just distribution when the incentives it permits are solely for 
encouraging people to perform jobs they enjoy. This means that these jobs do not require 
remuneration to compensate for the arduous expenditure of energy or the displeasing nature of 
the work. Cohen does say that such unjust distribution may be required to assist the worst off 
when drafting policy for a populace that does not have an egalitarian ethos (Cohen, 2008, 83). 
Cohen’s criticism of incentives that people wish to have, but genuinely do not need, is also the 
basis for his critique of the difference principle according to Pareto-improvements, the 
distinction between the public and the private, and freedom of occupational choice. 
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Cohen’s critique of non-egalitarian incentives is concerned with the motives that cause the 
deviation from the equal distribution of resources, which is the starting point for the Rawlsian 
difference principle. As we saw in Table 1, movement away from equality of distribution can 
only be considered just when the worst off benefit, since that is what people would choose as 
their definition of justice in the original position. But, this condoning of inequality does not 
consider the reasons why this inequality occurs. Broadly, Cohen thinks that inequalities can be 
grouped into two cases, one which is egalitarian and one which in inegalitarian (Cohen, 2008, 
56-58). The egalitarian case permits inequality in resource distribution to offset the arduousness 
or undesirability of the labor performed. The unequal pay that these laborers receive is equality 
preserving; it compensates them for their exertion beyond the norm or the displeasing nature of 
their work. The inegalitarian case is when certain individuals perform labor that they prefer and 
is not arduous. The only reason they receive unequal pay is because they prefer to receive high 
compensation. They are perfectly able and willing to perform the tasks they are qualified for but 
would rather do so only for a higher salary or higher investment return. 
The whole reason Cohen is concerned with this inegalitarian incentive is that he finds it to be 
a typical argument for the high compensation of certain jobs or high remuneration for 
investments (such as for entrepreneurs, chief executives, rentiers, and financiers). The incentives 
argument for these people is phrased in the terminology of the difference principle. If we do not 
pay these people high salaries or keep their taxes low then they will not produce as much as they 
could at their high pay or low tax rate and this will be to the detriment of the worst off (Cohen, 
2008, 35). These people are not being compensated for their difficult or unpleasant tasks, they 
are simply saying: ‘if you wish us to work to our potential we want more money, even though we
could perform at our potential without the additional compensation.’ To stress the difference 
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between this case and the case of the arduous or displeasing labor, those who perform these 
kinds of labor would say: ‘if you wish us to perform these task we need to have additional money
to compensate for the difficulty of the task.’ Simply put, inegalitarian incentives are not required 
for people to perform their tasks; they prefer to perform normally stressful and normally difficult
labor at a higher than necessary compensation rate. 
Cohen finds this derivation from equality incommensurate with the impulse of the difference 
principle because it takes equality as its starting point. Since Rawls endorses all movement away 
from equality that benefits the worst off, he does not attend to the starting point impulse being 
preserved in the transformation.9 This means that the difference principle, in the manner Rawls 
interpreted it, is inconsistently applied when the reasons for differential incentives are not 
examined. If the difference principle had a starting point that was one of inequality, but would 
only condone changes in the distribution which benefited, or at least left unchanged, the 
condition of the worst off, Cohen’s critique would be moot. But, why people would decide, 
under the veil of ignorance, to select an unequal starting point in the original position when they 
are implementing a maximin strategy is difficult to comprehend. The perspective of the original 
position makes it difficult to argue for why people would allow such differentials when they are 
in a situation to prevent them from occurring. Additionally, if you don’t know what your abilities
will be would you readily accept the notion of paying people more for labor that they can 
perform at a normal rate? Seemingly no. But, one would be willing to use incentives to 
encourage people to perform necessary labor which is difficult and unappealing since it would 
benefit the worst off, for example digging deep water tunnels, garbage removal, and sewer 
repair.
9 Rawls would not allow gains that were due to unjust actions such as slavery, assault, theft, etc. These actions 
would be forbidden by the first principle of justice. 
11
Cohen extends his critique of the difference principle to include a critique of Pareto-
improvements due to inegalitarian incentive payments (Cohen, 2008, 79 and chapter 2). In Table 
2 there are three distributive situations. Situation D is an initial situation of equality and 
situations E and F are Pareto-improvements. 
Table 2
Situation Resource shares for
the worst off
Resource shares for
the best off
Total resources of
society
D: Initial Equality 5 5 10
E: Unequal Pareto-
Improvement 
6 7 13
F: Equal Pareto-
Improvement
6.5 6.5 13
Table 2 has been developed by the author.
Cohen finds that if situations E and F are Pareto-improvements, situation E demonstrates non-
egalitarian incentive payments (that is incentives for work which is not difficult or displeasing), 
and situation F demonstrates a Pareto-improvement which is equality preserving. Both situations 
have the same total resource gain for society, only the distribution of the gains is different. With 
this kind of example Cohen wishes to show that inegalitarian incentive payments are not strictly 
necessary for Pareto-improvements when the incentives are only for appeasing the preferences of
certain groups. Cohen summarizes his consideration of egalitarian Pareto-improvements as such: 
The set of possible social worlds will, moreover, usually contain a Pareto-optimal equal distribution 
that is also Pareto-superior to the initial equality, and that must be preferred to the recommended 
unequal distribution, on pain of abandoning the rationale of the initial equality. (Cohen, 2008, 90).
Cohen’s interest in pointing out why incentives are needed in certain situations stems from his
approval of Marx’s critique of liberal rights theory developed in On The Jewish Question 
(Cohen, 2008, 1). Marx considers the liberal theory of rights to divide people into two: public 
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citizens and private persons. Liberalism provides equality for public citizens but does not do so 
for private persons. Public citizens are conceived of in the abstract, as equal before the law, 
whereas, private persons are denied the means for exercising their liberty, which is access to the 
means of production. Moreover, Cohen finds Marx’s critique to hold for modern day liberalism, 
including Rawlsian liberalism. This division between public and private persons is a deep rift in 
liberal political philosophy that is demonstrated by its condoning of inegalitarian incentive 
payments that are not really to the benefit of the worst off, since the best off don’t truly require 
compensation for their labor. The deep rift that Cohen, following Marx’s lead, identifies in 
liberalism only requires that people submit to the public legal enforcement of egalitarianism. 
They do not have to accept the egalitarian ethos as a personal norm. 
This division between public egalitarian citizens and private inegalitarian personal gain 
maximizing behavior prevents a society from achieving the best outcomes for the worst off as 
evident in Table 2. If people commit their private lives to egalitarianism then the rapacious 
outcomes of situation E can be avoided and the gains available in situation F can be achieved. As
Marx argued, if society is divided between public equality and private inequality people’s lives 
will not be as full as they can be. Cohen emphasizes an egalitarian ethos as the missing element 
of the liberal egalitarianism of Rawls. Considering this point from the perspective of the original 
position we can see that people, under conditions of uncertainty, would understand how 
endorsing an egalitarian ethos would be the maximin outcome if the choices were between 
situations E and F. Indeed, once one has realized that a starting point of equality would be 
maximin it is evident that possible Pareto-improvements that preserve this equality would be 
prized. 
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Finally, Cohen wants to discuss the freedom to choose one’s occupation under the constraints 
of egalitarianism. As has been shown in Table 2, people who have an egalitarian ethos should 
choose to perform labor that they prefer for less compensation as a way of improving the 
situation of the worst off, even though they could protest and threaten to not work as hard as they
could, thus forestalling a Pareto-improvement and keeping society in situation D (Cohen, 2008, 
58). Cohen wants to consider if the egalitarian demand to accept less pay to assist the worst off 
also applies to the selection of jobs. Cohen’s consideration only applies to jobs people prefer to 
do. If they take a job they do not prefer they are due additional compensation, which is congruent
with extra pay for people who perform arduous or unpleasant tasks (Cohen, 2008, 211). 
Cohen in interested in confronting what he considers a trilemma between equality, Pareto-
improvements, and freedom of occupational choice (Cohen, 2008, chapter 5). The examples 
above have demonstrated a dilemma between equality and Pareto-improvements. Traditionally 
this dilemma considered a tradeoff between equality and Pareto-improvements as the sole 
outcome because the only motivation considered possible has been inegalitarian personal gain 
maximization. But, Cohen has demonstrated that one can have Pareto-improvements and 
equality if people are motivated by an egalitarian ethos. The trilemma would involve trade-offs 
between either egalitarian Pareto-improvements that sacrifice occupational choice, egalitarian 
outcomes that preserve occupational choice and sacrifice Pareto-improvements, or Pareto-
improvements that preserve occupational choice but sacrifice egalitarian outcomes. Cohen thinks
the traditional understanding of the trilemma requires one of the three desired outcomes to be 
sacrificed. 
Not surprisingly, Cohen again wants to show that an egalitarian ethos can promote people to 
choose a job they prefer while also preserving egalitarian Pareto-improvements. He shows how 
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this is possible by critiquing Amartya Sen’s famous example of a Paretian liberal (Cohen, 2008, 
187). The Paretian liberal example demonstrates that when people cannot coordinate their 
optimal preferences an agreed outcome will be sub-optimal. Cohen thinks that Sen’s example is 
lucid but he thinks that, “within the structures of possibility that liberal rights create, you cannot 
both be loyal to certain values and get what you would prefer (not all things considered, but) if 
you prescinded from those particular values (Cohen, 2008, 188).” Sen’s reading of the trilemma 
would be that no Pareto-optimal outcome is possible when people retain their preferences. 
Whereas, Cohen finds that we can have Pareto-optimal outcomes that are egalitarian while 
preserving our preferences if the choice is between a set of jobs we prefer. If one is motivated by 
an egalitarian ethos one can select a preferred job at an egalitarian pay rate which is Pareto-
optimal (Cohen, 2008, 189-190). 
Of course, one may have a greater preference to perform another job, or the chosen job at a 
higher pay rate. Cohen acknowledges this, but his solution preserves occupational choice 
because one does prefer the job chosen, one just prefers another job more. Cohen’s reasoning is 
in alignment with Rawls’ original position and social contract reasoning in general, where the 
keynote is that people concede certain actions for the benefits of social organization.10 In the 
Rawlsian original position people seek stability, the gains made possible by social union, and the
fulfillment of their self-respect (Rawls, 1999, 14, 372, and 491). The assumptions of Rawls’ 
political model are thus followed by Cohen who is only taking Rawls at his word that people 
wish to live in a well-ordered society where they can develop a sense of justice amongst citizens 
(Rawls, 1999, 498). And, I would say, that Cohen is only adhering to the standards of western 
political philosophy as this passage from Aristotle shows:
10 Such reasoning is part of the social contract tradition: see Hobbes (1994, chapter 14) and Locke (2003, 137).
15
Concord appears to be political friendship, as the phrase is used; for it is concerned with matters of 
expediency and those which affect our whole life. Such concord exists in good men, for these have the
same thoughts in themselves as well as in relation to one another, having the same things in mind so to
speak; for the things wished by such men are constant and do not ebb and flow like the water in the 
strait of Euripus, and they also wish what is just and expedient, and these are the things they 
commonly aim at. (Aristotle, 1984, 170).
Concord, Rawls’ sense of justice, Cohen’s egalitarian ethos, or Marx’s higher stage communism,
are all names for the same consideration, which is that the best form of social organization can 
only exist if people are committed to its success and well-being. Cohen is only reminding 
Rawlsians, and liberals in general, what they supposedly believe in and what they have all 
learned already.
Cohen has demonstrated in great detail and with great insight that liberal political philosophy 
has a flawed understanding of distribution if inequalities are considered just if they are to 
appease rapacious groups. Simply, Cohen has critiqued liberals on their own terms, with their 
own game, and has demonstrated that their assumptions do not lead them where they wish to go. 
Nonetheless, I think that for all of the strengths in Cohen’s critique of Rawls’ difference 
principle he leaves out the important Marxist critique of capitalism in his appraisal of 
inequalities. I will return to these matters in the final section after I outline Cohen’s analysis of 
constructivism. 
III: G.A. Cohen’s Critique of Constructivism
A brief description of terminology is necessary before I move into the details of Cohen’s critique
of Rawlsian constructivism using of his own intuitionist method.11 Constructivism is a method 
for the selection of norms according to what people would choose as these norms. This is exactly
what the original position is meant to do, help people decide the set of norms they wish to live 
11 Cohen also calls the method he employs radical pluralist and he also declares himself a “partisan” of standard 
deontology (Cohen, 2008, 4). 
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by. Intuitionism is the selection of norms according to our own intuitive judgments. As Cohen 
describes it: 
[W]e determine the principles that we are willing to endorse through an investigation of individual 
normative judgments on particular cases, and while we allow that principles that are extensively 
supported by a wide rage of individual judgments can override outlier judgments that contradict those 
principles, individual judgments retain a certain sovereignty. (Cohen, 2008, 4.)
Cohen’s critique of constructivism posits that the selection of principles of justice in the 
original position is not the ultimate grounding for normative determinations. Rather, Cohen finds
that what is decided in the original position are rules of societal regulation that are based on 
fundamental normative principles that precede and shape our choices of these rules within the 
original position. Also, Cohen thinks Rawls’ claim that all normative principles are based on 
facts is incorrect. Rather, Cohen argues that all rules of regulation and all normative principles 
that are fact sensitive are ultimately grounded upon further normative principles that are fact 
insensitive. In a nutshell, Cohen thinks that constructivism can provide rules for social regulation
but these rules are based on fundamental normative principles that are derived from our own 
individual intuitive judgments that are not demonstrated by facts (Cohen, 2008, 275). 
Cohen does agree that many principles P that people invoke will be in light of a fact F. But, if
the invoked principles are examined people will eventually arrive at a principle which is fact 
insensitive P1 (Cohen, 2008, 234). I have paraphrased an example that Cohen provides:
RP: We should keep our promises.
RF: Because only when promises are kept can people successfully pursue their projects. 
RP1: We should help people pursue their projects. (Cohen, 2008, 234).
Cohen finds that RP1 is fact insensitive, which means that there is no fact that supports or 
demonstrates RP1. Principle RP is fact sensitive and is demonstrated by the fact RF. Cohen does 
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not offer a multitude of examples but the general idea is clear: our normative judgments develop 
fundamental principles which ultimately have no factual basis. This means that the way we 
should live our lives and what we should strive for is determined not by our natural and social 
conditions but by our deepest intuitive convictions. Social conditions do shape which rules of 
regulation are rational to select, but these rules of regulation are only just if they are in agreement
with our intuitive fundamental principles.12 
Cohen uses his intuitionist method to show that the constructivist original position does not 
generate fundamental normative principles. The original position only generates rules of 
regulation, which are based on intuitive fundamental principles. The difference principle is not a 
fundamental normative principle; it is rule of regulation. As Cohen describes this relationship:
One strategic fact is that there exist goods with which people need to be provided to pursue their life 
plans. Those help to yield the general conception, together with the unstated fact-insensitive principle 
that, so far as possible, everyone should be equipped with what, if anything, she need to pursue her life
plan, if she has one, which in turn rests on the principle that one ought to promote fulfilling lives. 
(Cohen, 2008, 293).
The difference principle’s notion of providing social integration via the just distribution of 
resources is not a rational notion demonstrated by facts. Instead, Cohen insists that why people 
want to facilitate the lives of others is because they have a deeply held conviction. This means 
that the reason why people implement the difference principle is because people want to promote
fulfilling lives. Rawls has shown that if the conditions of the original position shift to allow for 
more personal knowledge in the decision-making process people will select forms of utilitarian 
distribution (Rawls, 1999, 142). But, the fundamental distributive principle will be, no matter 
what the conditions are for the selection of the rules of regulation, that people should promote 
12 We can, of course, select rational rules of regulation that are unjust. Cohen would think it would be foolish not to 
do so in cases where just outcomes are impossible (Cohen, 2008, 82). That is we enter into a modus vivendi with 
others to have a functioning but unjust society. This would be the best of possible circumstances, the other option 
being civil war.
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fulfilling lives. Thus, fundamental normative principles hold even if certain facts do not obtain, 
such as the veil of ignorance conditions. 
Cohen’s intuitionist method demonstrates that constructivism does not determine fundamental
normative principles. There is something that precedes the selection of rules of regulation. But, I 
don’t think they are intuitively derived fundamental normative principles. Rather, I have the 
suspicion that humans’ natural-material capacities and requirements may be what ultimately 
forms the basis by which we select rules of regulation. 
IV: A Materialist Critique of Cohen and Rawls
In this section I will argue against Cohen on two points. First, I will argue that Cohen leaves out 
the Marxian analysis of inequality to the determent of his critique of the Rawlsian difference 
principle. Second I will argue that the basis Cohen’s intuitionism and Rawlsian constructivism is 
built upon is ultimately the natural-materialist structure of human existence, and not intuitive 
principles or the rational choices that people make. 
Cohen’s critique of incentives that are not equality preserving does not consider a 
fundamental factor of why such inequalities are possible: that the social relations of any mode of 
production favor certain behaviors that coincide with the accumulation patterns indicative of that
particular mode of production. For example, within feudalism behaviors that facilitate feudal 
accumulation patterns, appropriation of an agriculture surplus, are favored; whereas, within 
capitalism behaviors that facilitate capitalist accumulation patterns, extraction of surplus value, 
are favored. Capitalism arose out of the possibility of surplus value extraction under feudal 
conditions and within its mode of production capitalism is structured around this extraction. 
Thus, actions that facilitate surplus value extraction are intrinsic to the operation of capitalism 
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and are not an extraneous occurrence. Inequalities that allow people to capture a greater share of 
an extracted surplus are sanctioned by the ethos of capitalism. The egalitarian ethos that Cohen 
finds absent in Rawls’ construction of the difference principle is due to it being in conflict with 
capitalism’s ethos of exploitation and alienation. Simply put, we can’t expect an ethos of 
egalitarianism to arise when the fundamental social relations do not prize or reward such an 
ethos.13 
Cohen’s critique of Rawlsian distributive justice misses a problem that Rawls thinks he can 
avoid: that the inequalities of capitalism are due to its internal dynamics.14 Rawls identifies the 
inequality of capitalism as not intrinsic to it, but only a byproduct of the absence of the 
difference principle, or another just distributive principle. Capitalism will limit inequality and 
exploitation if the difference principle and other just institutions are in effect (Rawls, 1999, 247-
248). This means if a just basic structure is in place people will desire that others are not 
exploited. But, can such an outcome be possible when capitalist competition obtains? Even if 
people don’t wish to exploit others, the demands of competition require capitalist to exploit 
workers to survive as capitalists. Rawls essentially wants competition without the negative 
results. The problems countries with substantial welfare systems have had in the past thirty years 
resisting the demands of capital should make one reconsider the plausibility of Rawls’ claim.15
Cohen’s endorsement of an egalitarian ethos at first appears that it could be a critique of 
Rawls neutrality on how different modes of production favor certain distributive outcomes. But, 
Cohen’s egalitarian ethos is only a critique of Rawls reasoning, and not a critique of the pass that
13 Richard Miller (1974) has reached a similar conclusion.
14 Rawls does think that a just society can be capitalist or socialist (Rawls, 1999, 235-242). Rawls thinks that a 
county’s “traditions, institutions and social forces” determine whether it is socialist or capitalist (Rawls, 1999, 242). 
The selection of economic systems is not a matter for justice, or, more to the point, it is not a factor in the 
development of the well being of people. Rather, what causes a country to have advantageous outcomes is a just 
basic structure and not its mode of production. See Holt (2009b) for a more detailed presentation. 
15 On the attempted rollback of welfare systems see: Herrera (2006) and Stephens (1996). On the limits of social-
democratic control over capital see: Esping-Andersen (1999, 184).
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Rawls gives to the effects of capitalist accumulation dynamics. Cohen does mention that people 
may become habituated to the distributive outcomes of their mode of production (Cohen, 2008, 
50); they thus find their wages or capital income to be a natural distributive pattern.16 His critique
is to point out that Rawls is not consistent in his appraisal of equality. Cohen does not consider 
that capitalist accumulation dynamics are unable to foster an egalitarian ethos, even though he 
has endorsed a similar point elsewhere (Cohen, 2000, 304; Cohen, 1995, chapter 1). Cohen’s 
critique of Rawls’ inconsistent consideration of equality is right but misses the basic flaws of 
Rawls’ political economy where the dynamics of capitalist accumulation can be harnessed 
without detrimental effects. Rawls’ thinks that capital can be rendered neutral as a lever of 
development. Cohen’s endorsement of an egalitarian ethos leaves out the societal basis for the 
fostering of such as ethos. 
Cohen thus goes the route of critiquing Rawls on inconsistency concerning equality, but why 
not go the route of demonstrating the impossibility of egalitarianism within capitalism and then 
examine the distinct problems of incentives faced by a developing socialist society? True Cohen 
is worried about socialists being swayed by the egalitarian impulse of the difference principle, 
but socialists already consider capitalism incapable of providing non-exploitive outcomes. This 
is why they are socialists and not liberals. The audience that can then be best affected by Cohen’s
critique are liberals. He backs them into a corner where they must decide between equality or 
inequality. The option of having an inequality that both lifts all boats and maintains the 
egalitarian ethos originally agreed to, is ruled out by Cohen’s critique. The difference principle 
turns out to be, at its root, a simplistic invisible hand story once again. In short, Cohen is right 
that the egalitarian ethos must follow from the initial equality decided as maximin in the original 
16 Marx’s discuss this phenomenon in Marx (1976a, 680). 
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position, but his critique leaves out the determination that capitalism is not an adequate mode of 
production to foster egalitarianism.
The incompatibility of capitalism and egalitarianism brings capitalism as a maximin solution 
into doubt. If the parties under the veil of ignorance are seeking to provide the most 
advantageous situation for those with the lowest expectations then socialism is the maximin 
solution. This is the case because the following aspect of socialism (there are many others in 
addition): 1) the means of production cannot be alienated from the populace, 2) remuneration 
decisions are a collective matter, 3) investment cannot be withheld by private interests, and 4) 
egalitarianism can be considered intrinsic to the production, accumulation, and distribution 
dynamics of the socialist productive mode. These aspects of socialism are maximin compared to 
capitalism, which is contrary to all of them. Rawls’ primary interest of having a society that is 
not divided in its interests and finds its social life to be a good is the spirit that drives Cohen’s 
emphasis of an egalitarian ethos. But, people are innately divided within capitalism due to its 
core organizing dynamic of surplus value extraction through exploitation. Parties under the veil 
of ignorance find egalitarianism to be maximin, and accordingly they would also find socialism 
to be so also.
Now onto the second point, I find that the basis that both Cohen’s intuitionism and Rawls’ 
constructivism is built upon is ultimately the natural-materialist structure of human existence, 
and not intuitive principles or the rational choices that people make.  Fundamental normative 
principles are demonstrated by humans’ natural-material existence which takes into account our 
social nature and our ability to materially shape our environment. I think that the fundamental 
normative principles that Cohen finds lying beneath social rules of regulation are fact sensitive to
humans’ natural-material existence. Also, the rules that Rawls derives from the original position 
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are not based on intuitively derived fundamental normative principles as Cohen says, but are, in 
actuality based on the natural-material existence of human beings. This means that humans’ 
natural-material conditions must be attended to in the construction of any form of social 
organization. Accordingly, humans’ natural-material existence is a set of facts that fundamental 
principles and rules of social regulation must be sensitive to. 
In order to elucidate what humans’ natural-material existence is and how it provides a basis 
for normative principles and/or rules of social regulation I will draw on passages from Marx and 
Engels that have formed the groundwork of my considerations.17 First, a long passage from The 
German Ideology:
The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which 
abstraction can only be make in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the 
material conditions of their life, both those which they find already existing and those produced by 
their activity. These premises can thus be verified in a purely empirical way.
The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals. Thus 
the fist fact to be established is the physical organization of these individuals and their consequent 
relation to the rest of nature. Of course, we cannot here go either into the actual physical nature of 
man, or into the natural conditions in which man finds himself – geological, oro-hydrographical, 
climatic and so on. All historical writing must set out from these natural bases and their modification 
in the course of history through the action of men.
Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like. They 
themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means 
of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organization. By producing their means of
subsistence men are indirectly producing their material life. (Marx and Engels, 1976, 31.)
And years later, in Results of the Immediate Process of Production, Marx comments:
Man can only live by producing his own means of subsistence, and he can produce these only if he is 
in possession of the means of production, of the material conditions of labour. It is obvious from the 
very outset that the worker who is denuded of the means of production is thereby deprived of the 
means of subsistence, just as conversely, a man deprived of the means of subsistence is in no position 
to create the means of production. (Marx, 1976, 1003.)
17 I have argued for a similar and more detailed presentation elsewhere, Holt (2009a). 
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Humans’ natural-material conditions are the ground which all human action, desirable or 
undesirable, stems from. When we consider how human organization should be arranged we 
need to understand what humans are and what they need as natural-material creatures. Marx and 
Engels present a set of facts about human existence that form the groundwork which one can 
develop rules of social organization. The above passages, I think, provides this set of facts:
HF1. Humans are natural creatures that have certain physical requirements.
HF2. Humans have the natural ability to shape their environment.
HF3. Human social organization is shaped by their physical requirements and their natural ability to 
manipulate their environment. (This point is reiterated by Marx, 1973, 83). 
HF4. Human social organization further shapes humans’ ability to manipulate their environment. 
HF5: Types of human social organization can inhibit the satisfaction of humans’ physical 
requirements and can also inhibit humans’ ability to manipulate their environments. 
These facts must be taken into account when formulating principles of social organization 
because they are the foundation of humans’ natural-material existence. Any sound principles of 
social organization have to take the facts of humans’ natural-material existence as their basis. 
Otherwise, the principles of social organization would be, at best, incoherent, or at worst, 
destructive to human life. 
A set of principles that can be formulated from these facts:
HP1: People should have their physical requirements met: demonstrated by HF1.
HP2: People should be able to manipulate their environment: demonstrated by HF2.
HP3: Social organization should facilitate the satisfaction of physical requirements and the 
development of people’s abilities: demonstrated by HF3 and HF4.
HP4: Types of social organization that do not sufficiently satisfy people’s physical requirements or 
sufficiently development their abilities should not be used: demonstrated by HF5.
We can, I think, develop a set of normative principles from a set of facts about humans’ natural-
material existence. For example, if we look at what Cohen thinks is a fact-insensitive principle 
for the difference principle, which I will call CP1, “one ought to promote fulfilling lives,” I think
that CP1 can be demonstrated by facts HF1 through HF5 because fulfilling lives are 
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synonymous with people having their physical requirements met, being able to manipulate their 
environments, and living in society that does not inhibit these requirements and manipulations. If
I am correct, the fundamental principle CP1 that serves as the basis for distributive rules of 
regulation is fact-sensitive. 
Cohen, I believe, would reply by saying, ‘all well and good, but the principles you have 
derived are actually based on principles that are fact-insensitive if you examine their foundation.’
This is a possibility. We can reach principles that are indeed fact-insensitive, which could be the 
foundation for the fact sensitive principles HP. But, the fact-insensitive principles we reach are 
abstract when considered in light of the facts of humans’ natural-material existence. I think some
principles of this type are:
XP1: Humans should be alive.
XP2: Humans should be able to breathe.
These XP principles are fact-insensitive. But, their fact-insensitivity is pointless. It is 
unnecessary to even recommend them as principles because they tell us what is obvious from the
set of HF facts listed above. If humans’ natural-material existence is a given for most normative 
considerations (see the following paragraph), why then should we retreat to fact-insensitive 
principles that tell us what we have to deal with already as facts? I think there is no reason. 
XP type fact-insensitive principles are possible ethical statements if we consider ethical 
statements as being analytically separated from political-social statements. We can discuss 
humans in this abstract manner, but this discussion is purely scholastic and does not attend to 
facts that must obtain for humans to have a materially stable social arrangement. I think that 
Cohen’s considerations are correct that all principles are based on fact-insensitive principles (of 
the small set of XP types principles), but only in an analytical sense that does not add 
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meaningfully to our normative understanding. After we accept the assumption that humans 
should be alive we must attended to the facts of their natural-material existence which we shall 
have to base normative principles upon.18 
Rawls does consider a similar notion about principles/rules being grounded on the facts of 
humans’ natural-material existence. He calls the account of what humans require the “thin theory
of the good (Rawls, 354).” The thin theory of the good establishes a set of facts about the 
resources required for humans to exist at an optimal level indexed to the historical level of 
productive development. This thin theory allows people to construct principles of justice:
This account of the good I call the thin theory: its purpose is to secure the premises about primary 
goods required to arrive at the principles of justice. Once this theory is worked out and the primary 
goods accounted for, we are free to use the principles of justice in the further development of what I 
shall call the full theory of the good. (Rawls, 1999, 348).
Broadly, I am in agreement with Rawls concerning the factual basis for normative political 
principles. But, as discussed above, Rawls does not attend to the serious limitations capitalism 
imposes on the satisfaction of physical requirements and the development of abilities. Simply, I 
think that Rawls’ allowance of regulated capitalism violates principle HP4 listed above. Once 
again, why would one, when in the original position under the veil of ignorance, with knowledge
of the history of capital accumulation, inequality, and crisis, select property-owning democracy, 
when socialism appears to be the maximin solution? Rawls does not attend to the set of facts 
about humans’ natural-material existence when constructing his set of principles. His theory thus
poorly approximates the requirements for human action and development. 
The normative necessity that private persons and public citizens should be unified within 
society underpins Cohen’s intuitionist method. The generation of our norms is not our social 
18 There is the possibility that extends beyond the theories of Marx, Rawls, and Cohen, which is that humans have 
evolved to have an innate desire to live. This would be a fact that we could base the XP principles upon. 
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agreement. Rather, our intuitive normative principles structure what our social agreement must 
address for the entirety of human personality to be supported. I would say that a materialist 
grounding of our social organization does the same thing while being fact-sensitive. Private 
persons and public citizens have the same natural-material basis. Their basis, as social contract 
theory presupposes, is not their abstract existence as rational choosers. 
 
Conclusion
Cohen has shown that Rawls can’t have inequality in the application of the difference principle 
when the parties of the original position favor egalitarianism as a starting point. But, capitalism 
precludes this critique by being an inhospitable ground for egalitarianism to take root. Even with 
this limitation I am curious to see if his critique will effect a reappraisal of the liberal political 
conception of justice that takes the enjoyment of basic liberties as primary (Rawls, 1993, 6). 
Rawls spends much time trying to demonstrate that these basic liberties will not be upset by the 
inequalities of the difference principle (Rawls, 1993, 324-331). The most important reason for 
this is to forestall the development of reasonable envy that will prevent a society from having a 
sense of justice (Rawls, 1999, 468-470). Simply put, economic inequalities prevent people from 
seeing participation in their society as a good. People will feel their society is unjust if the 
foundational notions they accept as fair go unfulfilled. As Cohen demonstrates, the liberal 
conception of justice, which prizes the enjoyment of basic liberties, fails in its facilitation 
because of the contradictory sanctioning of inegalitarian incentives. 
Even though Cohen is successful, he misses the weakest link in liberalism, at least in 
Rescuing, which is its neglect of human natural-material existence being disrupted by the 
dynamics of capital accumulation.  Only when human’s natural-material needs cannot be 
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alienated can we meaningfully have the unity of public and private selves that Cohen wishes to 
follow from Marx’s analysis in On the Jewish Question. Interestingly, a second theme Marx 
considers, which Cohen does not discuss in Rescuing, is the merely formal nature of the liberal 
conception of basic liberties (Marx, 1975, 229). The public and private division and merely 
formal liberties are interrelated problems. Cohen doesn’t consider why liberties are intrinsically 
formal for liberal political theory. The superstructural presentation of liberties will be in 
conformity with the economic base of a mode of production (as Cohen himself discusses it in 
Cohen, 2000, 232). The liberal conception of rights facilitates capital accumulation. Freedom 
will only be the freedom to own property as long as civilization’s is organized to serve the 
requirements of capital accumulation and not human need. If we wish to correct the liberal 
division between public and private selves the merely formal conception of liberties must be 
corrected also. One cannot live up to the ideals of our society if social dynamics are contrary to 
these ideals. The flaw in the egalitarianism of Rawls is due to capitalism’s inability to 
accommodate humans as natural-material beings and not mere fictions. Cohen’s critique of 
Rawls’ inconsistency misses what has caused it. 
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